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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) NO. 7796 CIVIL ) 
) 
) 
) 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
the State of Utah 
Honorable Wm. Stanley Dunford, Judge 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arose out of a collision bet~en 
an automobile driven by the defendant and one 
Jackson Blaine Cox, deceased, a pedestrian. 
The collision occurred at approximately 
1:30 A. M. on Janu~ 21, 1951, as defendant 
was driving southerly at 35 to 40 miles per 
hour (T.R. 179) on the west side of u. s. High~y 
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91, in the city of Orem, Utah, and in the vicinity of 
the City Hall and the Cro~ Cafe (T.R. 15, Stipulated 
Diagram) • At that place, the high'\JIS.y runs in e. north-
erly and southerly direction, and is intersected to the 
south and on the east side only by Center Street (Stip-
ulated Diagram). It is hard surfaced and has a total 
width of 96 feet from curb to curb. There are two 
sets of double lines in the center of the highway, each 
set being approximately one foot in ~dth and separated 
by three or four feet, thereby forming a center zone~ 
To the ~st of the center zone there are three lanes 
marked for traffic, the inside and middle lanes each 
being t~lve feet in ~dth and the outside lane forty-
nine feet in width and extending to the curb (Stipulated 
Diagram). 
The collision occurred at a point bet,~en the City 
Hall and the Crom Cafe -which, according to the markings 
of the Stipulated Diagram, ~uld be from fifty to one 
~ 
hundred feet north of the corner of Center Street (Stip-
ulated Diagram). There was no marked cross~lk, ex-
tended crosswalk, pedestrian tunnel, or overhead pedes-
trian crossing at or near the place of collision, the 
nearest being eight blocks north, and there ~~s no 
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traffic control present (T.R. 139, 162, Stipulated Dia-
gr~). The high~y was straight, level, and dry, and 
lights were located on the Cro'WO Cafe, Post Office, 
Ci~ Hall, and the north corner of Center Street ~ich 
caused the high'\\fly to be well lighted in the vicinity 
(T.R. 13, 81, 51, 117, 180• 203, Stipu1e.ted Diagram). 
Just prior to the collision, the decedent departed 
on foot from the Cro~ Cafe on the ~st side of the high-
ray for his home 'Which vas located to the east, and had 
proceeded across the street to .a point six or seven feet 
east of the most easterly center line, ~en he reversed 
his direction and began to walk in a -westerly direction 
across the ~~gh~y (T.R. 12, 108, Stipulated Diagram). 
The evidence is in dispute as to the exact place 
or the collision on the highey. There is testin1ocy 
'Which would tend to establish that it occurred in the 
inside lane (lane 1), to the ~st of the center zone 
and near the line separating lanes 1 and 2 (T.R. 12,53~ 
54, 55 108, 109, 231, 233, Stipulated Diagram), and there 
is also evidence ~ich might tend to establish th~t it 
occurred in the middle ~ne (lane 2), ~st of the center 
zone (T.R. 255, 261, 262, 294). 
Following the accident, marks ~re found on the 
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high"WS.y '\"wnioh -were identified as being caused by the 
sv~rving of defendant's automobile. These marks com-
menced in lane 2, and extended'in a sharp curve to the. 
southeast across lane 1 to the center z·one (T .R. 158, 
Stipulated Diagram). The body of the decedent came to 
rest on the 11est side of the highve.y and south of th·e 
svrerve marks, the exact location of ~ch is not clear 
from the evidence. Certain testimo~ would place the 
location of decedent's body 50 feet north of the corner 
of Center Street and on the line separating lanes 1 and 
2 to the ~st of the center zone (T.R. 147, Stipulated 
Diagram), ~ile other testimony would indicate that it 
came to rest near the center of the high~y and at a 
point close to a projected north line of Center Street 
(T.R. 42, 73, 91, Stipulated Diagram). Two small pieces 
of chrome '~re found after the collision near the east 
line of lane 2 and near the swerve marks., 'Which were 
identified by one ~tness as being from the right front 
headlight of defendant's automobile (Blue X's Stipulated 
DiagramJ T.R. 153). 
Jackson Blaine Cox died as a result of the collis-
ion, and left surviving him his widow and three minor 
children. His 'Widow, Norma D •. C.ox, as Administratrix of 
-4-
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his estate, brought this action against the defendant to 
recover damages for his wrongful death. The case "Was 
tried before a jury, and the trial court directed a 
verdict for defendant and against plaintiff upon the 
ground tb~t deceased was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout and 
in failing to heed the approach of defendant's oar~ and 
the trial court further ruled that the Last Clear Chance 
doctrine, not being available in tP~s case, the negligence 
of deceased proximately contributed to produce his death 
as a matter of law, and that therefore, as a matter of 
law, the plaintiff could not recover (T.R. 334). 
STATEMEl-TT OF POI1TTS-
n:. THE TEIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTil\TG A VERDICT 
AGAI~mT PLAI~~IFF UPON THE GROUND THAT DECEASED 1mB CON-
TRIBUTORILY NEGLIGE11T AS A YLATTER OF LAY, I~T THAT DE-
CEASED WAS PF~SUMED TO RAVE BEEN ACTING ~TH DUE CARE, 
AND SAID PRESUMPTION -WAS lTOT OVERCO:rt~. 
II. TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTilJG A VERDICT 
AGAINST PL\I:NTIFF UPON TEE GROIDID TF.AT DECEASED -WIAS CON-
TRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A WlATTER OF LAW, IN TEAT CON-
TRIBUTORY ~~GLIGENCE ~ A QUESTION OF FACT FOR TEE JURY. 
III. TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT 
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AGAINST TEE PLAINTIFF UPON THE GROUND THAT DECEASED 
liAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LA.lf, AS 
TliE QUESTION OF 1tBETHER OR NO DECEASED'S CON'l'RIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO HIS 
DEATH liAS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRAN'.riiD RES.POND-
E1""!8 MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN REFUSIID 
TO SUBMIT THE APPELLANT'S CASE TO THE JURY ON TEE 
THEORY CF lAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TEE TRIAL COURT ERP~D IN DIRECTING A VER~­
ICT AGAI}iST PlAINTIFF UPON THE GROIDID THAT DECEASED 
liAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGE1TT AS A MATTER OF IAlf, 
IN THAT DECEASED 'WAS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEE~! ACTIID 
WITH DUE CARE, AliD SAID PRESUMPTION WAS NOT OVERCOME. 
The testimony fails to disclose 'With absolute 
certainty Whether the deceased ~~s walking, running 
or standing at the time of the impact, or whether 
he was looking and keeping a proper lookout for 
defendant's automobile, or the exact location on 
the highey 'Where the impact occurred. The plain-
tiff, Norma D. Cox, testified that she only observed 
-6-
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decedent commence to walk to,•rd the west side of the 
high~y from a point six or seven feet east of the center 
zone, and that as she then turned to get into a parked 
automobile she heard the collision (T.R. 14). Alma 
Ferre, testified that he ~s standing in front of the 
Cro.n Cafe at the time of the accident, and that he 
watched the decedent ~lking to~rd the ~st side of the 
bigh~y, but did not observe him closely for one or twn 
seconds just prior to the impact (T.R. 53), ho~ver, he 
did ~tness the collision and testified that the deced-
ent ~s struck ~le in lane 1, near the line which sep-
arated lanes 1 and 2 (Stipulated Diagram, T.R. 53, 54, 55). 
Another ~tness, Ruth Ferre, testified that she saw 
the decedent turn around in the high~y when six or seven 
feet east of the center zone, and commence to walk ~st, 
but did not observe h~ again until she saw him "flying 
through the air" (T.R. 108, 109). 
Leon Wimber, a friend of the defendant, ~o ~s 
riding in the front seat of defendant•s car at the time 
or the accident, testified that he first observed the 
decedent as a "dark s~Adow', ~ioh stepped from the left 
side of the car wmdch was "in the east of us, directly 
into ojr lights, from the side" (T.R. 231). Further 
-7-
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testimony of this 'Witness 'V\fJ.s to the effect that "when 
I first saw the man, he Vt.&s to the lett of the front of 
the oar, and as ~ swerved, it brought the right fender 
over to where he 1\6.S at, and he hit right about where 
the light and the hood come in contact there," ••• (T.R. 
233); that he did not believe the oar had crossed into 
lane 1 at the time of the collision (T.R. 233). Such 
testimony, ~uld tend to corrobora~e the testimony of 
Alma Ferre, supra, ~th regard to the point of impact 
being in lane 1, and even though this witness observed 
the decedent moving westerljl, there is nothing to refute 
the possibility that decedent ~s then and there right-
fully proceeding across lane 1 toward the line separat-
ing lanes 1 and 2 (Stipulated Diagram). 
Karl Smith, also a passenger in defendant's auto-
mobile, testified that he first observed the decedent 
while the automobile ms swerving to the southeast (T .R. 
255, 261)1 and that the decedent -ras "standing" at a 
distance of 15 feet in front and about even with the 
center of the automobile which -was swerving to the south-
east (T.R. 255, 262). This witness did not observe 
whether the decedent ~s looking in any particular direct-
ion. 
-a-
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The defendant, Cyril P. Thompson, testified that 
he first observed the deceased as a "silhouette" to the 
left of the automobile (T.R. 290), and "as I stated. he 
stepped into the light, When I seen him, and he ~s stepp-
ing, and I swerved, and I glanced a'WB.y from him to see if 
there ~~re any other oars or anything coming, and I didn't 
see him again." (T.R. 293). Upon further cross examination 
of defendant, he testified as follo~: (T.R. Z95) 
"Q. Now you didn't observe whether or not he ~s 
looking at you, did you ? 
"·A. I didn't observe that., no. I didn't have time. 
All I seen vas him step in front of us, and 
that silhouette, and I s~rved." 
Defendant further testified that the deoedant could have 
been as far as 19 steps (57 feet) or ~re in front of the 
automobile and to the left, at the time he vas first ob-
served (T.R. 292, 293). 
In view of the testimo~ of the foregoing witnesses, 
regarding the conduct of the decedent. and the authorities 
hereinafter cited, it is plaintiff's contention that the 
presumption of due care, to ~ieh the decedent was entitled 
was not overcome, and to hold that the deceased was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law., ~s error. The 
follo~ng oases are hereinafter cited in support of this 
contention: 
-
i i 
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In the recent case of Mingus v. Ollson, (Utah-1949), 
201 Fao. 2nd 495~ a pedestrian ~s struck and killed while 
crossing a high~y in an extended cross walk. In this case 
the court ruled that the presumption of due care was over-
come by the undisputed testimony of decedent's wife that 
that the decedent failed to look in any direction before 
stepping into the street. The concurring opinion states: 
"Of course, if there ~s a complete absence of 
evidence as to ~ether he took any precautions to 
avoid the accident, then the law creates a presump-
tion that he took reasonable precautions for his o~ 
safety and that he was injured in spite of such pre-
cautions. 
"But here there ~s evidence from which the 
jury could reasonably find that he took no pre-
caution for his o~ safety~ and on the production 
of such evidence the presum;tion disappears from 
the case and the question must be determined from 
the evidence. Of course the facts upon which the 
presumption is based are still in evidence and if 
they have a logical tendency to prove that the de-
cedent used reason~ble care for ~~s o~ safety~ they 
may be considered in determining the question." 
In the case of Davis v. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railway Co.~ 45 utah 17, 142 Fao. 705, the deceased was 
hit by defendant's train and there ~re no ~tnesses ~mo 
testified regarding the facts surrounding the accident. 
In this case~ the cogrt gave the following instruction 
which, on appeal,was sustained as being proper: 
"There is a presumption of law that every 
man exercises due care for his o~ safety when 
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in a place of danger and that deceased did so 
at the tiiTe and plaoe vhen and where he met death, 
so that plaintiff was not required to prove affirm-
atively that deceased looked and listened for the 
train, the presumption being that he did so, and 
burden on defendant to prove other~se, which was 
bound to establish that fact by a preponderance 
of the evidence." 
In the recent case of Compton et al v. Ogden Union 
Ry. and Depot Company, (Utah-1951), 235 Fac. 2nd 515, 
the decedent ~s struck and killed by defendant's engine 
in its yard. At the conclusion of plaintiff'' s case the 
trial court entered a judgment of dismissal. At the time 
of the accident, the decedent ~s ~lking ~th a oompan-
ion who accounted for all of her movements ~ediately 
prior to, and at the time she was struck. 
The court in its opinion said that there is a strong 
presumption based on the instinct of self-preservation 
that the deceased was exercising due care for her own 
safety and which may take the place of evidence suffic-
ient to make findings on, in the absence of other evi-
dence. It then goes on to say: 
"The presumption is applicable 'Where there 
is no evidence as to care used, or perhaps Where 
the evidence comes from an adverse ~tness iho 
may be subject to disbelief by the jury, or Where 
there is sufficient uncertainty in the evidence 
&I to cast doubt on the testimony." (underlining 
ours). 
In the case of Evans v. Oregon Shortline Ry. 
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co., 37 Utah 431, 108 Pac. 638, an action was brought 
against defendant to reoover for the ~ongful death of 
decedent ~o ~s struck and killed by defendant's engine 
While crossing defendant's tracks ~th a team and ~gon. 
The court there stated: 
Hit is a presumption of law that every man exercise 
due care for his 01~ safety ~en in a place of dang-
er, and the presumption is that deceased did so ~en 
he approached the crossing." 
In the case of Clark et al v. Union Pacific Ry Co., 
70 utah 29~ 257 Fac. 1050, the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover for wrongful death resulting from a 
oollEion at a rail~y crossing. There ~s a conflict 
in the testimony regarding the ~rnings given by defend-
ant. Ho-wever. it -was established that the visibility 
ms poor, and a fireman testified that he observed the 
decedent some 125 feet from the crossing and anticipated 
that he would stop for the train, but ~en he failed to 
do so he ~s struck and killed. There the court states: 
"The burden of proving contributory negligence, 
of course, ~• on the defendant. In absence of 
evidence, there is a presumption that the de-
ceased looked and listened, and did all that 
prudence and due care required ••• 
"The question thus is, does the record con-
clusively show that deceased failed to look 
and listen, and that by looking and listening 
he could have discovered the approach of the 
-12-
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train in tin1e to have stopped and let it pass •" 
The court considering the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, found the question of 
contributory negligence to be for the jury and re~Anded 
for rehearing. 
~he most recent pronouncement of this point, 1Vh.ich 
we have found, is set forth in the case of Tuttle v. 
Pacific Intermountain Express, (Utah-1952), 242 Pao. 
2nd 764. In this case, the decadent was struck and 
killed While driving in his automobile upon a public 
bigh•Y• The evidence was conflicting as to whether 
or not the decedent had unexpectedly turned left in 
front of defendant's truck ~ile both ~re traveling 
south, or Whether defendant's machine crossed the center 
of the high~y and collided with decedent's automobile 
traveling north. All of the eye witnesses testified 
~ 
that the collision occured ~en decedent attempted to 
make au-turn in front of defendant's tractor trailer. 
In the concurring opinion of Justice Crockett he says: 
"The jury's verdict for the plaintiff plainly 
sho~ that they did not believe the deceased 
was going southward, but on the contrary their 
finding •s that he was coming toward the north. 
Under those circumstances, there is no evidence 
~tsoever regarding his conduct just preoeed-
ing his death. Therefore, the plaintiff is en-
titled to the presumption that he used due oare 
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for his own safety, and upon that presumption 
the jury could base their refusal to find him 
guilty of' contributory negligence." 
In the case at bar, none of the witnesses saw whether 
decedent was keeping a lookout,. and certau1ly the evi-
dance is highly controversial as to the point of impact. 
The cases are numerous in other jurisdictions deal-
ing with this point, some of the most prominent of which 
are the following California decisions: 
In a ~ongful death case entitled Blackmore v. 
Brennan~ 43 Cal. App. (2d) 280, 110 Pac. 2nd 723, Where 
a motorist ~s struck and killed in an open intersection, 
the court there said: 
"In the absen·ce of evidence overcoming the pre-
sumption it should prevail ••••• In other words 
the j~ ~s told in effect that it must deter-
mine Whether sufficient evidence had been adduced 
to overcome that presumption." 
In the case of Rios v. Bennett, 88 Cal. App. {2d) 
919, 200 Pao. 2nd 73, the decedent was killed at night 
time while walking across the street diagonally out of 
the pedestrian lane. .A witness testified that the de-
ceased walked into the path of defendant's automobile 
which the witness had seen 70 to 75 feet away. There 
the court held: 
"A pres~tion existed that a pedestrian struck ••• 
by an automobile used ordinary care for his o~ 
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safety and that in doing so he looked before 
he stepped out into the street." 
The oase of Duehren v. Stewart, 39 Cal. App. 201, 
102 Pao. 2nd 784, is one where a pedestrian was struck 
and killed while crossing a highway in a crosswalk at 
an intersection at 8:00 p. M. Evidence was introduced 
that the decedent didn't turn his head or look. The 
loViier court instructed the jury regarding pres,umption of 
due care, and on appeal the court stated: 
"It has been repeatedly held that disputable 
presumptions are evidence in a case ••• , and suoh 
presumption may be controverted by other evidence • 
••• It has also been repeatedly held that it is a 
~estion for the jury to determine whether the pre-
sumption has been overcome by evidence offered in 
contradiction thereof ••• Respondents produced no 
evidence to determine ~t observations Mr. Dueh-
ren made just before he attempted to cross the 
street. Appellant offered no evidence as to whether 
the deceased looked prior to the time he stepped orr 
the curb. Respondents -were therefore entitled to 
the presumption above mentioned as their own evi-
dence ~s reconcilable ~th it, and such presumption 
remained as evidence in the case until dispelled 
by evidence offered in contradiction thereof.". 
In the case of Greenslitt v. Three Brothers Batik-
ing Company, 170 Ore. 345, 133 Pac. 2nd 597, the dace-
dent ~s struck by defendant's automobile as he ran 
across the highway in a diagonal direction. There the 
court helda 
-15-
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"The evidenoa tending to shownegligenoe on his 
part is not of suoh conclusive oharaoter as to 
overcome such presumption as a matter of law. The 
issue of contributory negligence was properly sub-
mitted to the jury." 
In the case of 1f.iswell v. Shinners, 47 Cal. App. 
(2d) 155, 117 Pao. 2nd 677, a pedestrian was struck 
and killed while in the process of crossing a highway, 
and there '\'8S evidence to the effect tl-t..a.t he -ms not in 
a crosswalk at the time of the accident. The court 
there said: 
"In urging that the direct evidence furnished 
by an eye witness in this case dissipated the preflt: 
sumptions established by law, respondents fail to 
appreciate the limitations upon the power of the 
trial court When directing a verdict as such limita-
tions are laid do~ in Estate of Flood and Estate 
of Lances, supra. Under the familiar rules there 
enunciated, when there is a sho~ng on behalf of 
the plaintiff of certain facts as in the instant 
case, certain physical facts such as skid marks 
and their relation to the point of collision and 
the point at Which the driver first applied his 
brakes; the speed of the automobile; the failure 
of the driver to sound his horn or otherwise give 
~rning; the unobstructed view of deceased on the 
part of the driver for some considerable distance; 
the clearness of the weather and the dryness of the 
street, together ~th the presumptions relied upon; 
and when on the other hand, evidence both direct 
~~d circumstantial favorable to their cause, is 
introduced by defendants, the latter evidence must 
be eliminated from consideration by the court for 
the purpose of ruling upon a motion for a directed 
verdict. 
"1fe therefore conclude that appellant was en-
titled to the benefit of the presumptions here 
claimed until dispelled by ev1denoe opposed to 
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them. and that it was for the jnry to determine 
whether the presumptions had been overcome by evi-
dence offered in contraction thereof, and which 
last-named evidence the court was not permitted 
to oonsider in ruling upon the motion for a dir-
ected verdiot. 
n·cases cited by respondents in support of their 
claim that the presumption is destroyed by evidence 
in contradiction thereof are all oases where appeals 
were taken from final judgments, in the rendition 
of Which the court or ju~ was entitled to pass 
upon the ~ight of all the evidence submitted and 
to judge of the credibility of ~tnesses. Such 
power is not within the province of a court in rul-
ing upon motion for non-suit or directed verdict." 
From the cases cited where the presumption of due 
oare has been an element dealt ~th, it should be noted 
that the courts have oon.sistently allowed the question 
of contributory negligence to be submitted to the jury. 
In the case at bar, a reasonable man could find from 
the evidence that the deceased used due care by stopping 
in lane 1 to allow passage of defendan~s vehicle, which 
he could legally and reasonably assume would continue in 
the lane of traffic Which it occupied, rather than into 
his lane. Also, under many of the cases cited actual 
eye-witnesses have testified regarding the conduct of 
the deceased party which, if proven true, would establish 
contributo~ negligence, ho~ver, even under such circum-
stances the court has entertained the presumption of due 
-17-
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care and allo,red the jury to dete~nine Whether the evi-
denoe has been sufficient to overcome it. In the case 
at bar, the evidenoe is totally lacking as to whether the 
deceased ~s keeping a proper lookout, and it would be n 
pure conjecture to say that he failed to look and see or 
that he continued to 11V8.lk into the path of defendant• s 
oar oblivious to the circumstances then and there existing. 
It is for these reasons that we respectfully submit that 
the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant 
and against the plaintiff. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT 
AGA!?-TST PLAINTIFF UP01:r THE GROUJ\il> THAT DECEASED 1fAS 
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAT, IN THAT 
CONTRIBUTORY 1\JEGLIGENCE liAS .A QUESTION OF FACT FOR TEE 
JURY. 
In treating this point, ~ should first recognize 
the respective rights of the parties at the time the 
collision occurred. 57 -7-143, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, subsection (a) provides: 
"Eve~ pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
shall yield the right-of-~y to all vehicles 
upon the roadway." 
With respect to the law a~;plioable under the 
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facts in question, it is stated in Mingus v. Ollson, 
201 Pac. 2nd 495, (Utah-1949), where the oourt there 
said:: 
"The rights of pedestrians to the use of 
public streets are the same as those of motor-
ists ••• neither greater nor less." 
(See also Am. Jur. Vol 5, page 615, Section 
201; Blasbfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 
Vol. 2, Sections 1241, 1242, 1243). ~ 
The rule applies irrespec.tive of -what portion 
of the road or street the pedestrian may walk upon. 
Assuming that defendant ~s driving in lane 2 (Stipu-
lated Diagram), as the evidence ~uld tend to establish, 
all that ~s required of-the decedent under the eir-
cumstanees 7B.s that he yield to the defendant the 
right of ~y to the lane in Which defendant was driv-
ing, provided ho~ver, that the defendant's automobile 
~s then so near decedent as to make a crossing of 
the lane hazardous. Certainly the decedent was not re• 
quired to yield to the defendant the full 96 foot high-
way or even half of same. He could rightfully assume 
that the defendant would not deviate from the lane in 
which he ~s traveling, particularly when, as from the 
evidence (T.R. 2'95), there was no necessity for doing 
so. Therefore, taking the interpretation of the eviaence 
-19-
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most favorable to the plaintiff, it is contended by 
appellant that decedent had proceeded· westerly across 
the highway into lane 1 (Stipulated Diagram), to a 
point near the east line of lane 2, and was there 
struck by the defendant 1 s swerving automobile. This 
contention is supported by the follo~ng testimony: 
Alma.Ferre, the only eyewitness from a station-
ary position, testified that he saw the actual point 
of impact and placed same as being in lane 1 near the 
east line of lane 2 (T.R. 53, 54, 55). The test~ony 
of defendant's ~tnesses, Karl Smith and Leon ~mber, 
referred to in point I (supra), .vrould at best present 
a question of fact for the ju~ as to the exact point 
of impact and the conduct of decedent. To further 
support such a contention appellant refers to the time 
element involved. T~e testimony most favorable to the 
plaintiff would indicate that the decedent, if walking, 
was proceeding at 4.1 feet per second (T.R. 122, 123). 
To reach the east line of lane 2 (Stipulated Diagram), 
he would have walked a total distance of approximately 
24 feet from the point Where he reversed h~s direction, 
thus requiring approximately 5.9 seconds to do so. 
-20-
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The test~ony of the plaintiff, to the effect that she 
observed the decedent turn around and start back and that 
she had just turned to get into a parked automobile 
~en the collision occurred (T.R. 14), ~uld tend to 
corroborate the testimony of Mr. Ferre placing th~ 
collision in lane 1. Also, the evidence on the part 
or the defendant's ~tnesses establishes the follo~ng: 
The decedent was first observed by the occupants 
of the car to the front and left of the vehicle (T.R. 
231, 233, 255, 261, 262, 293, 294); the s~rve ~s 
sharp and to the southeast (T.R. 145, 195, 233, 255., 261, 
293, 294); the defendant, upon first observing the de-
cedent, s~rved to the south east and looked away and 
never saw b~ again (T.R. 125); neither the defendant 
nor the passengers in his car saw whether the decedent 
was keeping a lookout. This testimony, in the light of 
the testLmony of plaintiff's ~tnesses ~uld definitely 
present a question of fact for the jury as to the issue 
of contribute~ negligence. 
Appellant further contends that the evidence re-
garding the location of the pieces of chrome on the 
high~y (T.R. 153), and the disputed testimony of the 
witnesses as to the location of the decedent's body 
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£ollo~ng the collision, is by no means of sufficient 
quality or significance to justi~ a ruling by the trial 
court of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
In this connection, it must be considered that when 
two opposing bodies meet at an unkno~ angle, there 
can be no hard and fast rule of p~sios governing the 
direction a pieoe of chrome or body may fall or be de-
flected, and certainly suoh circumstances would not 
justi~ or require that the trial court take judicial 
knowledge that suoh objects would fall at a specific 
point on the highway. The unkno~ elements regarding 
the angle at whioh decedent was struck, his movements 
immediately prior t~ and at the time of impact, are 
too numerous to say definitely that the metal or de-
cedent's body would fall at a given point. It is 
suggested by appellant, that it is logical to assume 
that the pieces of chrome may have been flipped by 
decedent's clothing, kieked and moved by people in 
the highway after the collision, ricocheted from de-
fendant's automobile, or even possibly flipped by the 
wheels of the investigating officers vehicle which he 
drove do~ the center of the highway to investigate 
the accident. To assume that the impact occurred at a 
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\~s crossing the highway at a point where there was 
no pedestrian lane, much the same as the case at bar, 
when she was struck by an oncoming oar. The court 
there said: 
"Ho~ver, the evidence was in conflict as 
to how plaintiff acted in relation to the sur-
rotmding circumstances, the direction she was 
going at the time, as to -where she ms hit, the 
location of the Hood oar, and other matters. 
1e cannot say therefore, that the conduct of 
plaintiff constituted negligence as a matter of 
law, particularly ~en vie~g it from the 
standpoint of plaintiff and her witnesses. No 
error ~s committed in denying the motion for 
directed verdict." 
In the case of Hunter v. ~iohaelis {Utah-1948), 198 
Bac. 2nd 514, a pedestrian ~s struck while crossing 
a highvay in California in the nighttime._ Although the 
Utah Supreme Court applied California substantive 
law in deciding this case, it nevertheless held that 
there ~s no contributory negligence as a matter of 
law for the pedestrians failure to see. 
In the case of Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 
478, 189 Pao. 2nd 127, ~ere testimony was intro-
duoed to showthat plaintiff did not look upon enter-
ing the intersection, the unanimous court held that 
the question of contributory negligence vas a jury 
problem. 
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In the recent oase of Spackman v. Carson (Utah-
1950)~ 216 Fac. 2nd 640~ Where a motorcyclist struck 
a truck ~ioh pulled onto the high~ in front of him, 
the court there said: 
"under the circumstances ~ are convinced 
that the issues of Whether the plaintiff was 
negligent in failing to keep a more diligent 
lookout ahead was properly submitted to the 
ju~ ••••• unless all reasonable minds must say 
that a party did not use due care under a par-
ticular set of circumstances, it is a question 
for the jury." 
The case at bar appears to be stronger than 
many of the cases cited as several inferences regard- '.r 
ing outlook or due care might reasonably have been 
drawn by the jury from all the evidence. The evi-
dence might well sustain a finding by e. jury that 
the decedent did look and see~ and as a reasonable 
man, misjudged the danger or that he looked and upon 
seeing defendant's car s~rving easterly to~rd him~ 
jumped ~sterly into lane 2 in an effort to avoid 
the collision and was, notwithstanding suoh efforts, 
struck and killed by defendant's machine, or that 
he looked and sa.w, and was in lane 1 at the time he 
ms struck. 
The rule of law announced in the Compton case 
(Supra), has been reaffirmed in the recent case of 
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6f Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. (Utah 
1952). 242 Fao. 2nd 764, (Supra), where the trial court 
t 
denied a motion for a directed verdict and allowed the ·. 
issue of contributory negligence to be submitted to the 
jury, notwithstanding the testimony of six eye wit-
nesses, who's testimony, if believed, vrould establish· 
contributory negligence on the part of decedent. 
The S'(jpreme Court of Utah there said: 
"If the evidence is such that it ~uld 
be unreasonable for anyone to believe there-
from that the Tuttle car vas traveling in a 
northerly direction before the collision and 
not in a southerly direction as appellants 
claim, then it is clear that decedent v~s 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. But if the evidence ~11 reasonably 
sustain a finding that decedent was traveling 
to~rd the north on the east side of the high-
vay and that as they ~re about to pass each 
other ~ile traveling in oposite directions , 
the tractor-trailer ~nt out of control and 
skidded over onto the east side of the high-
way and into the side of the Tuttle car. there 
is no sho~ng of negligence on the part of the 
decedent and there is a strong case of negli-
gence on the part of the driver of the tractor-
trailer and it was proper to submit that ques-
tion to the jury." 
In the very recent case of Poulsen v. Manness 
et al (Utah-1952). 241 Pao. 2nd 152, the plaintiff 
and defendant collided in an intersection. The 
court there said: 
-26-
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"The facts in this case are very similar to 
those in the oase of Lowder v. Holley (Utah-
1951). 233 Pac. 2nd 350, recently decided by 
this court. In that case, as in the instant 
oase, there was evidence that the plaintiff 
had stopped and looked in both directions be-
fore proceeding into the intersection and that 
the driver of the other oar was going at a high 
rate of speed and did not see plaintiff's oar 
which ~s already in the intersection until al-
most upon it. In the Lowder v. Holley case, as 
in the instant case, there was evidence of vis-
ual obstructions at the intersection which the 
fact finder had to consider. WE TBEF.E HELD THAT 
THE QUESTIONS OF 1mGtiGENCE OR CONTRIBUTORY NEG• 
LIGENCE HERE QUESTIONS OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED 
BY 'ffi..E FACT FINDER. THAT CASE IS CO}.YTROLLI1JG 
HERE AND TEE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTIID 
THESE QUESTIO~JS TO THE JURY." (Caps ours) • 
In the concurring opinion of Chief Justice 
Wolfe in the Poulsen case, he stated: 
"IN CASES CONCERNING TRAFFIC lfHERE THE 
SITUATION IS I:i\T FLUX AND DEDUCTIONS DEPEND 
ON THE BASES ASSUMED, WHICH MAY BE A CHOICE 
AMONG PERMUTATIONS Alto COMBINATIONS OF FACT-
OF..S, THE TRIAL COURT, Ul~ESS ONLY ONE COMB-
INATION OF FACTORS UNDER ANY REASONABLE VIEW 
OF TEE EVIDENCE IS PERMISSIBLE, SHOULD NOT 
FIND NEGLIGENCE AS A lvl.ATTER OF LAlf." (Caps ours). 
It appears that the rule·announced in the fore-
going oases has been adopted in our sister states of 
California, Colorado, Idaho~ Kansas, Montana, New 
Mlxico~ Oregon, and Washington. 
In the case of Lawrence v. Kansas City Power 
and Light Co., et al, 167 K·an. 45, 204 Pao. 2nd 
752, the plaintiff and defendant collided in an 
- r7 
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open intersection and the trial court directed 
a verdict for defendant upon the ground of oontrib-
utory negligence as a matter of law. The Supreme 
Court of Kansas stated~ 
"Before a oourt can rule as a matter 
of law that negligence has been established, 
the evidence ahould be so clear that reason-
able minds could have but one opinion~ namely: 
that the party VfS.S negligent." 
In the case of Martin v. Harrison, 182 Ore. 
121, 18~ Pac. 2nd 534, a pedestrian ~s killed 
while crossing a high•y, not at a cross-.lk. The 
Supreme Court of Oregon there said: 
"Contribute~ negligence becomes a 
question of law only when from the facts 
reasonable men ce~ draw only one inference 
a.nd tmt inference points unerringly to 
negligence of plaintiff contributing to 
the injury, and in other cases the question 
of contributory negligence is one o£ fact 
for the jury. If a. pedestrian crossing a 
street fails to look or looks straight ahead 
without glancing to either side ••• he is 
guil~ of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law, but if he looks but does not see 
approaching automobiles, or seeing one, 
erroneously mdsjudges its speed or dist-
ance, or for some other reason assumes he 
could avoid injury to himself the question 
of contributory negligence is for the jury." 
In the case of Rios v. Bennett, (Supra), a 
pedestrian was killed vhile crossing a public high-
way at night. There vs.s no evidence of whether 
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the pedestrian looked before proceeding into the 
highway. The California Court statei: 
"Whether a mistake in judgment by a 
pedestrian when crossing a street, as to 
speed and danger of approaching vehicles, 
constitutes contributory negligence is a 
qestion for the jury. As there 'WS.s no 
evidence ~ether the pedestrian looked or 
not a presumption existed that he used 
ordina~ care for his o~ safety and that 
in doing so he looked before he stepped 
out into the street." 
In the ease of Wis~ll v. Shinners, (Supra), 
where a pedestrian was struck ~ile crossing a 
high~y, the court there concludes: 
"on the record presented to us herein, 
we feel that the question ~ether decedent's 
behavior and conduct, that is to say, whether 
he looked and either did not see the approach-
ing automobile, or saw it and misjudged either 
its speed or distance, constituted no~tr~butory 
negligence under the particular circumstances 
then existing, ~s one of fact, as ~s also 
the question of whether decedent's conduct 
measured up to the requirements of that of a 
reasonable man in complying with the afore-
said Vehicle Code provision. The question of 
contributory negligence is al~ys one of fact 
for the jury to decide under proper instructions, 
except in those cases in Which, judged in the 
light of common knowledge and experience, there 
is a standard of prudence to which all persons· 
similarly situated must conform. It is only 
in these last-n~ed oases that failuee to ad-
here to that oommon standard is as a matter of 
law contributory negligence. Where different 
conclusions may reasonably be dra~ by diff-
erent minds from the same evidence, the de-
-29-
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decision must be left to the triers of faot. 
Therefore. under the facts and cirotunstanoes 
here present. the questions of the negligence 
of the defendant and the contributory negli-
gence of the deceased. as mll a.s the import• 
ant question of proximate cause, were all for 
the ju~ to determine in the light of. all the 
facts, circumstances and presumptions present-
ed by the evidence. 
"It should be understood that throughout 
this opinion ~ have follo~d the rule applic-
able to eases where the appeal is taken from 
a judgment following a directed verdict or non-
suit, ~ich rule requires that evidence, and 
presumptions as a species of evidence, shall 
be taken by the appellate tribunal in the light 
most favorable to the losing party in the court 
below. We are therefore expressing no opinion 
as to the weight of the evidence or its truth 
or falsity.n 
Other cases of interest where the facts and 
circumstances involved are akin to the case at bar, 
and ~ere the issue of contributory negligence or 
negligence bas been held to be a question o£ ravt 
are: P.rentis v. Johnston, 119 Colo. 370, 203 Pae. 
2nd 733; Stickel v. San Diego Electric Co. et al, 
32 Cal. 2d 157, 195 Fac. 2nd 416; Schoen v. Schroe-
der, 53 N.M. 1, 200 Fac. 2nd 1021; Flynn v. Helena 
Cab and Bus Co., 94 Mont. 204, 21 Fac. 2nd 1105 and 
Maier et al v. lfinidoka County Motor Co., et al, 61 
Ida. 642, 105 Fao. 2nd 1076. 
It is respectfully urged by appellant, that by 
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virtue o£ the authorities hereinabove cited and the 
facts and circumstances of the case at bar 1 the trial 
court oommdtted error in granting defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. 
III • THE TRIAL COURT ERP.ED IN DIRECTI~""G A 
VERDICT AGAINST PLA.I1'TIFF UPON THE GROUND THAT 
DECEASED WAS COJr.rRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATI'ER 
OF LAW, AS T~~ QUESTION OF liBETHER OR NO DECEASED'S 
C01TTRIBtTTORY 11EGLIGENCE1 IF ANY, PROXD-EATELY COli-
TRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR TEE 
JURY. 
The issue of proximate cause has been submitted 
to the jury in a great number of oases similar to 
the one at bar. Appellant contends that 1 in view 
of the facts and circumstances the proximate cause 
of the death of Jackson Blaine Cox was a question 
of fact to be submitted to the jury and that it 
was error for the trial court to crant defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict. 
In the case of Hess v. Robinson1 109 Utah 60• 
153 Fac. 2nd 5101 plaintiff was traveling on an 
arterial high~y and collided ~th defendant who 
ran a stop sign. The trial court directed a ver-
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diot that both ~re negligent as a matter of law, 
. but left to the jury the issue of' proximate cause. 
The court held that evan if the plaintiff had seen 
defendant's oar he ~uld have bean un§ble to avoid 
the accident by the tfme he had ascertained that 
the defendant would not stop at the stop sign. 
In the case of Hickock v. Skinner, 113 Utah 
1, 190 Pac. 2nd 514~ the dissenting opinion, speak-
ing of the Hess v. Robinson caae, said in part: 
"Although this court divided on the 
question of whether or not plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law, we agreed unanimously that 
the question of proximate cause ~s one 
for the jury." 
In tre case of Wright v. Maynard~ ( Utah-1951)., 
235 Fac. 2nd 916~ the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the rule laid down in the case of Nikoloeropoulos 
v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 Pac. 2nd 304~ to the 
effect that it is negligence as a matter of law 
for a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled 
public high~y, used by vehicles and pedestrians, 
at such a rate of speed that said automobile cannot 
be stopped ~thin the distance at which the operator 
of said ear is able to see objects on the high~y 
in front of him, and in so affirming said rule, held 
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that the question of proximate causa ~s a question 
for the jury. 
A Nevada oase~ Styris v. Folk. 146 Pac. 2nd 
782. Where a pedestrian ~s struck by a motor ve-
hicle while crossing a street in violation of a 
city ordinance stated in part: 
"There is no difference in principal 
as to the effect of negligence whether aris-
ing by violation of an ordinance1 or by ord-
inary negligence. In either instance, whether 
it is the remote or proximate cause of an 
accident, is a question of fact in each par-
ticular case •••• Although, as to the former, 
the negligence is presumed as a matter of law~ 
yet whether it is the proximate causa- of an 
accident is al~ys a matter of fact •••• JNeg-
ligence per se and proximate cause are t~ 
separate and distinct issues. While one is 
presumed as a matter of law, the other must 
nevertheless~ be proved as a matter of fact. 
Although appellant crossed the stre.et betW9en 
intersections, in violation of an ordinance, 
he cannot be held as a matter of law to have 
reasonably apprehended that in so doing injury 
would result. Even to a pedestrian, thus cross-
ing, a motorist owes the duty of exercising ord-
ina~J care. It is true that such ordinance 
gives to a motorist the right of way between 
intersections. Ho'Mlver, that right is not ab-
solute but preferential only,·and the motorist 
is not absolved from his duty of exercising 
ordinary care for the safety of pedestrians, 
rightfully or wrongfully on the highway be-
t-ween such intersections. Whether the cab 
driver in the instant case exercised such 
care ~sa question of fact for the jury.' " 
The case of Genola v. Barrett, 14, Cal. (2) 
-33-
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217, 93 Fao. 2nd 109, involved an accident Where a 
pedestrian was struck while crossing a street in 
violation of an ordinance. The Supreme Court o£ 
California there stated: 
"Not only did the trial court hold 
in the case at bar., as a matter of law, 
that plaintiff ~s contributorily negli-
gent, but that her negligence., -was,. per 
se., the proximate cause of her injury. 
Here., plaintiff ~s standing in the street, 
according to one eye-~tness., about ten or 
t-welve stB>nds • She then stepped back, at 
which time the car was not 'Within an approx-
imate eighty-foot range of vision of the 
witness. lihen defendant failed to see what 
was plainly visible, failed to slacken her 
speed, and failed to swerve her car a few 
inches to a void striking plaintiff who had 
yielded the right of way, it cannot be said 
that, as a matter of law, the negligence of 
plaintiff ~s the proximate cause of her 
injur.r•" 
Additional oases which have held that the 
particular case should go to the jury on the 
issue of proximate cause are: Baker v. Western 
Casualty & Sure~J Co.~ 164 Kan. 376~ 190 Pao. 2nd 
850; Atkins v. Morton, 164 Kan. 626, 191 Pac. 2nd 
909, Lawrence v. Kansas Power & Light Co. et al, 
167 Kan. 45, 204 Pac. 2nd 752; Amos v. Remington 
Arms Co.~ 117 Colo. 399~ 188 Fac. 2nd 896; Douglas 
v. Hoff, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 82, 185 Fao. 2nd 607; 
Maier et al v. Minidoka County Motor Co., (Supra); 
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Briggs v. United Fruit & Produce Inc.~ 11 ~sh. 
{2d) 466, 119 Pao. 2nd 687; Hart v. Farris, 218 
Cal. 69, 21 Pao. 2nd 432 and Pollard v. Wittman, 
28 Wash. (2d) 367, 183 Pao. 2nd 175. Each of the 
foregoing oases have involved aooidents on the 
high~y between vehicles or a vehicle and a ped-
estrian, and in many of such oases the facts and 
circumstances have been no stronger than ip the 
case at bar. 
It is respectfully urged by appellant that 
the evidence of the case at bar should have been 
submitted to the jury on the issue.· of "proximate 
cause as the jury might reasonably have found 
that in view of the lack of attention of the 
driver of the automobile to the road ahead and 
the abundance of light in the _vicinity where the 
oolasion occurred, the contributory negligence of 
the decedent, if a~, was not a contributing 
factor in the accident. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERF..ED IN GRANTI~N} 
RESPO-NDENT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT .A.ND 
IN REFUSING TO SUB:MIT THE APPELlANT'S CASE TO 
-35-
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T?E JURY 0!! TI1E THEORY CF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
In discussing Point IV Appellant is not unmindful 
of t':1e reoent oases o£ Graham v. Johnson 1 109 Uteh 346, 
166 Pao. 2nd 230; Van Wagoner et al v. Union Fao. R. 
Co •• (Utah 1947); 186 Pao. md 293; Hickok v. SkinneD, 
(Utah 1948), 190 Pac• 2nd 514; Holmgren v. Union Pao. R. 
Co. (utah 1948), 198 Fac. 2nd 459; Anderson v. Bingham 
& Garfield Ry. Co., (Utah 1950), 214 Fac. 2nd 607; and 
Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra, .~erein 
this Court has discussed the rule of' last.clear cha.noe. 
In the Graham Case, supra, this Court recognised 
the dosctrine ann ounced by the American Law Institute, 
Restatement of Torts, Vol. II, Ch. 17 Sec. 480 and 
reaffirmed its adherence to same i~ the Compton Case, 
supra. In the Compton Case this Court, speaking through 
Justice Crockett, stated: 
".A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance oould have avoided harm therefrom, 
may reoover if, but only if, the defendant (a) 
knew of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realized 
or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was 
inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover 
his peril in time to avoidthe har.mJ and (c) 
thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with 
reasonable oare and competence his then existing 
ability to avoid harming the plaintiff. 
-36-
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"It will be noted these sub-paragraphs are in the 
conjunctive and must all exist together before 
that Section is applicable." 
The Compton Case, being the most recent case in 
this State, appal'ently consolidates the single points 
heretofore ruled on by this Court where the doctrine 
or last clear chance was considered. It is interesting 
to note that most cases in this State have involved 
railroads and automobiles or individuals, and automobile 
and automobile, rather than auto-pedestrian accidents. 
It is agreed that the principles should be the same 
when the doctrine is invoked, but it appears to us that 
in applying the principles to the facts, that in the 
auto-pedestrian cases, one must bear in .mind that in 
our lives today the automobile has become a dangerous 
instrumentality due to its speed, increased numbers 
on our highwa.ys and its maneuverability. The automobile 
has an increasing radius of operation per seeond, 
depending upon its speed and other pnysical factors 
while the pedestrian' s_ radius of operatio.n per second 
is more or less constant and smallo 
It is easy to reconcile the railroad cases if one 
realizes that the railroad tra.cks are stationary; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hence an approaching train oan only proceed in one 
direction, and it is common knowledge that its operator 
can avoid animpending collision only by reducing its 
speed, stopping or giving a.n audible warning. The 
automobile oan avoid an impending collision by reducing 
its speed, stopping, increasing its speed, turning right 
or left, or by giving an audible· signal. 
With these thoughts in mind and at the expense and 
danger of repeating ourselves, it is found necessary 
to invite the Court's attention to the evidence most 
favorable to the Appellant in support of our contention 
that the trlal court erred in notsubmi tting the question 
of last clear chance to the jury. 
It is our contention that if b~. Cox could be 
found guil~ of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law, which ~ deny, of of fact, then and in that event, 
the elements of the conscious last clear chance doctrine 
as aet forth by Justice Crockett in the Compton Case, 
s upra, were present; and the trial court should have 
submitted the same to the jury for their determination. 
At tge outset ~ invi~e the Court's attention to 
the testimony of the def'ende.nt whioh sho\\iS him to be 
-38-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a very inexperienced driver of one year's experience, and 
to the fact that at the ti1ne he testified he had the 
benefit of ten month's additional driving experience ~ 
fro.m the time of the accident (T.R. 272, 280, 281, 
283, 292, 293, 295, 298, and 299). 
(a) DefendB~t knew of the decedent's situation: 
The defendant testified that his dim lights in 
head of him ~re illuminating the side of the road, 
~ 
and he could see well enough; that the dim light 
east a light out diagonally from the oar and that 
you could see a lighter spot in front of you; that 
is, sort of oblong; and then the light was cast off 
from the direct beam in front. He stated that vben 
he first saw :Mr. Cox that he appeared as a dark 
sillouette to his left as he stepped into thelight 
from the side, facing -west; that he could see the full 
length of him. He could not specify as to how much 
or the highway he could see, but he could see the full 
height of the man; that he saw him step into the lana 
he was traveling vdth his legs apart, and he walked 
across in front of the car (T. R. 271, 272, 288, 290, 
291, end 295). 
-39-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(b) The defendant realized or had reason to realize 
that Mr. Cox ·was inattentive and therefore unlikely to 
discover his peril in time to avoid the harm: 
It is reasonable that the jury would have foWld 
from the testimo~ and evidence that the deceased, 
after reach the .most easterly point on the highway 
(T. R. 12, 53, and 108), t\Uned and walked southwesterly 
towards the Ferre Car at the rate of 4.1 feet per 
second, at such an angle as to place his back partially 
toward the defendant's vehicle. He proceeded southwesterly 
from the most easterly point reached on the highw~ 
(T. R. 24) to the only point of impact placed on the 
stipulated diagram by an eye witness, Mr. Ferre (T. Ro 54), 
which appears on said diagram. on the west side of lane 
number one as a pencil point close to the swere ~ks 
and the pieces of chrome and identified by an rtF" o 
Projecting the decedent's line of travel into lane 
number two, coupled with the defendant's testimony 
as to what he saw and did, makes it apparent that 
a jury could reasonably find that the defendant realized 
or had reason to realize that ~. Cox was inattentive 
and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time 
-4Q-
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to avoid harm. 
In the Restatment of Torts, Section 480, 
supra, comment "B", it is asserted: 
"Roever, it is not necessary that the circumstances 
be such as to oonvinoe the def'endant that the 
plaintiff is inattentive and, therefore, in danger. 
It is enough that the circumstances are such as 
to indicate a reasonable chance that this is the 
ca.se. Even su~h a chance that the plaintiff 
will not discover his peril is enough to require 
the defendant to make a reasonable effort to 
avoid injuring him. Therefore, if there is any-
thing in ~e demeanor or conduct of the plaintiff 
Which to a reasonable man in the defendant's posi-
tion would in-dioate that the olaintiff is inatten-
.~.. 
tive, and therefore, ~11 or may not discover the 
approach of the train, the engineer must take such 
steps as a reasonable man ~uld think necessary 
under the circumstances." 
Even if -we were to consider only that portion 
of' the defendant's testimony to the effect that M:r. 
Cox walked unhesitatingly into his lane .of travel, 
this testimony in intsel f' should be sufficient to 
convince a jury that the driver iNB.S aware of the 
decedentts inattentiveness and una~reness of his 
peril. Under no circumstances would an alert and 
attentive pedestrain commit such an act. 
In the Graham Case, supra, this Court speaking 
through Justice Wolfe, stated: 
"Section 480 deals with the situation where 
the plaintiff was inattentive but had the· 
-41-
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ability, had he been alert, to avoid the oncoming 
danger to which the defendant was subjecting him. 
But in both cases the liability of the defendant 
arose because he failed to take the opportunity 
which he al.one had time to avoid doing the plaintiff 
harm even though the plaintiff was negligent in 
getting himself in a position where he was helpless 
or because he was so inattentive that he was not 
alert to the approaching danger over which defendant 
had control." 
We submit, therefore, that the testimony demonstrates 
that this element of the doctrine of last clear chance 
is present. 
(c) That the defendant thereafter was negligent 
in failing to utilize with reasonable care and compe-
tence his then existing ability to avoid harming 
Mr. Cox: 
It is necessary in considering this point to review 
the defendant's testimony together with that of his 
friendly witness, Wimber. 
It appears that the position of the car in lane 
number two is important. The defendant testified 
as to the position of his car therein immediately 
prior to the accident. He testified that when he 
looked to his left he could just see the lefthand 
line of the lane he was traveling in going along past 
the window, and he figured there must be two or 
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three feet down lat~en the oar and the line (T. R. 
270 and 289). The width of the oar was seven to 
eight feet (T. R. 174). 
Projecting the line of travel of 1lr. Cox into 
and across lane number two, it could reasonable be found 
that the point of impact could have occurred at any 
one of three points. • 
1
'he first possible point of impaot ·could have 
been just west of the dividing line of lane number 
one and two. Wimber, vmo was seated on the right side 
of the front seat of the defendant's ear, testified: 
that he saw the decedent step from the side into the 
car's lights; that he saw a persmn move fram the east 
to the west onto the lane of traffic in vhioh the 
car was traveling (T. R. 23ll 
He further testified: 
"Q• And will you describe that to the best of' 
your ability? State ~~ere it was and---
"A. 'When I first saw the man, he was to the left 
of the front of the car, and as we swerved, it 
brought the right fender over to ~ere he ~~s at, 
and he hit right about where the light and the hood c 
come in contact there, and rolled up over the 
right fender, partly on the hood, off Xk~ of the fender 
down to the siae, immediately in front of mysilf 
(T. R. 236) 
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The second possible point of impaat oould have been 
in t}"'-e center of' the lane (six feet). Winiber again 
testified: 
"Q• And how far did he get into your lane of 
traffic 1 the lat you saw him there? 
"A. Half' way across, approximately. (T. Ro 231)" 
The third p oint of impact could have occurred approxi-
mately eleven feet to the west of' the line dividing lanes 
one and two. 
Wimber also testified: 
"Q. Can you state when the oar was s~rved ~dth 
respect to when you saw the man? 
"A. Well., it was j-ust a split second after we 
saw him., after I saw him ••••• (To R. 236) 
"Q. Now how .far ahead of the car v;as he when you 
first noticed him? 
"A:. I thought at the time perhaps 15 feet. 
"Q. ·Did you feel any swerving of the car after 
yot~ saw him? 
"A. I think there ·vnl s. 
'
1Q. Was that perving imme·diately after the time 
that you first saw him, or did· the car travel a 
little bit before you felt the swerve .of' the oar? 
"A. It could have travelled a short distance. 
"~·· Now how fe.r across the width of the car did 
you observe him, the ~sternmost portion that he 
got? 
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"Q. After you had seen him, for the first time? 
"A. ·~·Jell he hit on the right hand part of the 
car (To R. 248)" 
The defendant testified that Mr. Cox might have 
been as far aw~ as 59 feet and could have been farther 
away than that when he first saw him (T. Ro 292 and 293)o 
It would be reasonable from the testimonr to find 
that the point of impact could have been at any point 
along the decedents proj eeted line of travel in lane 
two. The maximum. distance Mr. Cox could have traveled, 
at the rate of 4ol feet per second, into lane two 
would have required approximately 2.73 seconds elapsed 
time after he had entered said lane. At 35 .miles 
per hour the car would have been 139 feet away from 
Mr. Cox when he entered lane two. Adding the distrance 
the deceased traveled after he appeared as a sillouette 
from the left of the car a~ he entered the car 1 s light 
zone and prior to his crossing into lane two, would 
place the car farther away from decedent at the time he 
was first seen by defendant. At 35 miles per hour 
the defendant could have stopped his car in approximately 
97 feet from the point he saw the danger (38 feet 
-45-
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reaction distance and 59 feet braking distance). 
If the point of impact ~~s determined to be in 
the middle of lane two~ it would have required 1.46 
seconds for 1~. Cox to reach said p oint after crossing 
the line into lane t~. This would place the automobile 
75 feet a'WB.y from him 1Vhen he entered said lane. A 
jury could a.·gain find that the deceased travelled an 
additional distance from the time defendant first saw 
him enter tre ce.r!s light zone as a sdlhouette, 
thereby placing the irehicle farther ~-way from 1,,1z-. 
Cox when the danger was first perceived by the defendant. 
It is again reasonable to place the point of impact 
at or near the line separating lanes one and two. If 
such were the finding, then it is reasonable to infer 
that the sounding of a horn be defendant. which ~ 
not done, would have giVBn 1v1r. Cox the opportunity to 
stop and allow the car to continue its course, or to 
step back out of the way of the onoo.ming vehicle. 
It is evident that if the point of impact 
occurred at either of the above referred to extremes~ 
there was a last clear ohanoe for the defendant to 
avoid the injury or death of ~T. Cox. 
A~ e mot.ter Of fact. the 6Videnee Strongly SUggests 
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that after the defendant perceived the decedent, 
the defendant, through ~~citement or otherwise, 
negli.gently swerved into Mr. Cox, and that had the 
defendant continued in a straight line or sw~ed to 
the right, he would not have struck Mr. Cox. 
Therefore, it is respectfully urged by Appellant that 
the evidence of the case at bar should have been sub-
mitted to the jury on the issue of last clear chanc·e 
as the jlll'y might have reasonably found that the 
elements set forth in Section 480 of the Restatement 
of Torts and adopted by this Court were present. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it appears desirable to point out 
that if the testimony most favorable to the Appellant 
is considered, together with the reasonable inferences 
that ean be drawn from it, the facts of this case are 
such as to definitely fall within the province of the 
jury to determine, and that a directed verdict based 
upon these facts by the trial court constituted an 
invasion of such province. 
From the evidence and reasonable inferences based 
thereon, the jury could find on the one hand that the 
decedent was not contributorily negligent, or, if he 
I 
, I 
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was, that said negligence did not proximately contribute 
to his death; and, on the other hand, the jury could find 
if he was contributorily negligent that the defendant had 
a last clear chance to avoid the accident. 
The thesis behind the presumption of due care 
and the rule of last clear chance, based as they are 
upon human experience alXi a humanitarian policy, is 
designed to protect against the same set of circumstances 
that are extant in this ease. And the careless action 
on the part of the defendant, which the trial court 
termed as gross negligence, we feel bordered upon a 
wanton, reckless and criminal act. These doctrines 
were propounded to insure to the injured parties 
their fundamental right to a jury determination of 
the facts and issues involved. 
Appellant sincerely submits that the trial court 
erred in each of the rulings specified under the 
points herein presented and argued. 
-48-
Respectfully submitted, 
BRANT H. VIALL & JAY 
E.Ll\IER BANKS, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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